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Bounded rationality and altruism: 
behaviourism in economics
József Golovics
This essay is intended to respond to the criticism of economic science that it builds 
its models on unrealistic assumptions from the start. Perfect rationality and the 
axiom of self-interest are indeed two of the main tenets of neoclassical economics. 
In this paper, however, we argue that the application of these doctrines is far 
from exclusive. Indeed, with the achievements of the behaviourist approach and 
behavioural economics, the theory of bounded rationality was accepted as early 
as the last century in this scientific area, along with the recognition of altruistic 
behaviour. Many of these achievements have been more or less integrated into 
mainstream thinking by now, and once applied, by relying on more psychologically 
realistic assumptions they may significantly contribute to improving the forecasting 
power of economic models. 
1. introduction
The 2008 crisis had massive repercussions, not only on the real economy but also on 
economic thinking,1 and triggered profound changes in the approach to economic 
science and the public’s view of the discipline. It has become commonplace to 
“blame” economics for its failure to either forecast or adequately cope with the 
recession. At times, this attitude prompts the lay public to call into question the 
justification for the very existence of economics, claiming that the models and 
conclusions of the discipline are rooted in axioms that are false even in their basic 
assumptions.
Providing an exhaustive response to these criticism – including a description of 
the specificities of modelling and a detailed account of the “trade-off” relationship 
between the models in terms of manageability – is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Accordingly, this paper focuses solely on the two main premises of economic 
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science: the topics of perfect rationality and self-interest. As a response to the 
criticism of the science of economics, we argue that the application of these axioms 
is not exclusive, even within mainstream economics. Indeed, the acknowledgement 
of altruism and the assumption of bounded rationality were not unknown to 
economics – at least to some of its schools – even in the previous century.
In this paper we attempt to confirm our propositions by outlining the succession of 
the relevant paradigms. Reflecting on the criticism that the core subject of economic 
analysis is an idolised person rather than a real individual, we open our essay with 
an overview of behaviourism, an approach that places human behaviour at the 
centre of interest, and summarise the main achievements of behavioural economics. 
We then proceed to the topics of bounded rationality and altruism, concepts that 
present certain traits of human behaviour within the theoretical framework of 
positivism, based on empirical behaviour patterns. Undoubtedly, these concepts 
have called into question the two most basic tenets of neoclassical economics. 
However, they did so not by a complete rejection of the previous theory, but by 
resolving certain simplistic assumptions; in other words, instead of destroying the 
neoclassical framework, they merely intended to supplement and enhance it further.
Obviously, this does not imply that the classical human model of homo oeconomicus 
is no longer considered the cornerstone of economic science. However, in contrast 
to the frequently voiced lay criticism, economic science is undeniably familiar with 
and uses the concepts of bounded rationality and altruism. It is also a fact that 
several achievements of behavioural economics have now been unquestionably 
integrated into mainstream theory, which, in many cases, may improve the 
forecasting power of models and contribute to capturing reality with more precision.
2. Behaviourism in social sciences
Social studies, by nature, have never been entirely separable from the human being 
– the performer of actions – or human behaviour. Human behaviour has therefore 
always been considered in all social disciplines. The approach of behaviourism, 
however, has done so with far more emphasis: it attempted to understand social 
trends by placing the systematic study of human behaviour at the centre of focus, 
and demanded behavioural evidence for the verification of any hypothesis as 
a matter of course (Graham 2010).
Behaviourism first appeared in political science between the world wars. As 
opposed to the prevailing institutionalist approach which focused on the political 
establishment, its novelty was in its endeavour to analyse the political behaviour 
of the individual. In this particular form, behaviourism in political science 
represented a non-judgemental, positivist, descriptive trend, seeking to study 
various phenomena, as all other natural sciences, by relying on general theories 
(Tóth–Török 2003).
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In psychology, instead of cerebral processes and the conscious mind, behaviourism 
put behaviour under scientific scrutiny. The rationale behind this approach was 
the fact that, while the former is open to subjective interpretation in many 
regards, behaviour is a “public” and visible phenomenon, with the required 
data and information readily available. According to behaviourist psychology, 
human behaviour depends largely on environmental conditions and stimulations; 
consequently, it attempts to capture different phenomena by the stimulus-response 
model (Atkinson et al. 2005; Csépe et al. 2007).
Similar trends began to evolve in economic science as well. Although the 
appearance of the positivist approach in economics is traditionally attributed to 
John Neville Keynes (1890/1999) and the detailed description of its methodology is 
associated with Milton Friedman (1953), even the classical school was committed 
to observing human behaviour, and the methodological impact of natural sciences 
left its mark on marginalists. A behaviour-oriented approach manifests itself in the 
work of Marshall (1920) as well, who defined political economy and economics as 
“a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life” in the introduction to his book. 
Although from a different perspective, the two Nobel Laureates, Stigler and Becker 
(1989:111) had a similar approach to the issue. In their opinion, “the economist 
continues to search for differences in prices or incomes to explain any differences 
or changes in behaviour”. Simon (1959: 253–254) – another Nobel Prize winner 
who unquestionably belongs to the behaviourist school based on his work – in 
turn, defines economics as “the science that describes and predicts the behaviour 
of several kinds of economic man”.
On the whole then, it is indisputable that even though different schools of 
economics place different phenomena at the centre of their studies (e.g. exchange, 
institutions, macroeconomic trends), they cannot disassociate their work from 
human behaviour. The significance of this thought is underpinned in Becker (1976): 
“What most distinguishes economics as a discipline from other disciplines in the 
social sciences is not its subject matter but its approach. […] I contend that the 
economic approach is uniquely powerful because it can integrate a wide range 
of human behaviour, […] the economic approach is a comprehensive one that is 
applicable to all human behaviour” (quoted in Hámori 2003a:8). It is this general 
approach to human behaviour that has inspired, in recent decades, references 
to “economics imperialism”; in other words, the application of the approach and 
methodology of economics to a broad range of social sciences (Hirshleifer 1985).
3. Behavioural economics
Beyond a fundamentally positivistic and behaviour-centred attitude, behaviourism 
proceeded on a unique path within the realm of economic science and, to a certain 
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degree, bypassed the concepts described above. This led to the evolution of 
behavioural economics. Although it initially came into being as a heterodox school, it 
has now increasingly been integrated into the mainstream to become an extension 
of traditional economic analysis (Koltay–Vincze 2009). One of the novelties of 
behavioural economics is that it is based on a human model distinctly different from 
that of the neoclassical school: it dispenses with some of the characteristic features 
of the traditional homo oeconomicus. Some of them are basic premises constituting 
the backbone of neoclassical economics, while others are “less cardinal”; most 
of them, however, simply consider the natural constraints of the individual. The 
intention is to increase the realism of the psychological underpinnings of economic 
analysis in order to generate theoretical insights that are verifiable in practical terms, 
improving the quality and reliability of predictions and policy recommendations 
(Camerer–Loewenstein 2004). Thus, as regards its subject, behavioural economics 
point beyond Stigler and Becker’s (1989) aforementioned definition by observing 
human behaviour not only in terms of prices and incomes, but also in relation 
to other, “more human” factors. As such, behavioural economics is not a radical 
challenger of traditional theories; it is more like an amendment to them that helps 
expand the horizons opened up by its predecessors and hence, allows even the 
mainstream to integrate some of its results.2
We can state overall that in examining the behaviour of individuals and the drivers of 
their decisions, the trend relies heavily on the premises of neoclassical economics; 
however, it often supplements them with psychological insights, psychologically 
grounded features and emotional motives (Camerer–Loewenstein 2004; Mérő 2010; 
Rabin 2002). Thus, behavioural economics can be viewed, in certain regards, as the 
borderline between economics and psychology.
In respect of its methodology, behavioural economics draws heavily on empirical 
studies, including experiments. In contrast to natural sciences, however, economics 
cannot be regarded as an experimental science, as many economic phenomena 
(e.g. a crisis or decision on the base rate) cannot be exactly reproduced multiple 
times under controlled conditions. In recent decades, however, parallel to – or, to 
a certain degree, overlapping – behavioural economics, experimental economics 
(Smith 1989, 1994) has also gained significant ground in academic circles. Designed 
to model certain decision-making situations, these experiments pointed out that 
in certain situations people tend to systematically deviate from behaviour patterns 
considered rational by economics (Hámori 2003a; Mérő 2010). To a large degree, 
therefore, both experimental and behavioural economists base their assertions 
on empirical results (Sontheimer 2006). However, while experimental economists 
2  It follows from this that behavioural economics does not form a uniform school; in many cases, the 
authors express fundamentally different opinions. This is precisely why it is so difficult to provide a fully 
comprehensive overview of the trend.
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define themselves explicitly along the lines of this method, behavioural economists 
are not committed exclusively to experiments; they merely use experiments as 
a research tool (Camerer–Loewenstein 2004).
In addition to psychological considerations and empirical results, the findings of 
neuroeconomics also provide assistance to behavioural economists. This area 
seeks to understand human decisions and make behavioural predictions from the 
workings of the brain, using neuroscience (Camerer 2007; Camerer et al. 2005).
All of this demonstrates that the “toolset” and “subject pool” of behavioural 
economics is broader than those available to the neoclassical approach, and 
behavioural economists explicitly seek to replace unrealistic assumptions with better 
grounded premises. As a result, researchers in this area have arrived at results such 
as the description of benchmarks, sunk costs, commitment, packaging and validity 
bias, representativeness bias, alternative cost or the certainty effect (Camerer–
Loewenstein 2004; Hámori 2003a, 2003b). A common trait of these results is that 
they dispense with such neoclassical axioms as the theory of perfect rationality 
or the assumption of exclusive self-interest (Vanberg 2006). In the next part of 
the paper we focus on these two topics, examining their presence in neoclassical 
economics and taking account of the alterations introduced by the behavioural 
school.
4. Rationality in neoclassical and behavioural economics
One of the core assumptions of the neoclassical tradition is the rationality of 
economic agents (Vanberg 2006). This cannot be separated from the maximisation 
paradigm, a concept already present in the classical school. At that point, however, 
it was merely interpreted as “preferring more rather than less”, and even this 
assumption was primarily used to capture the production side. The next full 
step forward – the application of this theory to consumers – was taken by the 
marginalists: their rationality hypothesis was manifested in utility maximisation 
subject to budget constraints. And this approach, due to the anatomy of the 
demand curve, demanded the knowledge of the prices of all products on the market 
(Arrow 1986).
Subsequently, several versions and definitions of the rationality assumption were 
formulated; however, elaborating on them is beyond the scope of this essay (for 
more details, see Rubinstein 1998; Schiliró 2012; Simon 1955). Overall, it can be said 
that they mainly identify requirements in relation to consumer preferences, such as 
the criteria of completeness, transitivity, reflexivity and comparability (Hirshleifer 
et al. 2009; Varian 1991). Without their detailed overview, this paper is limited to 
the presentation of the main elements of more general definitions.
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Stigler (1987) identified three criteria of rationality: (i) consumers have stable 
preferences; (ii) they perform the correct cost calculations; and (iii) they make 
utility-maximising decisions. Koltay and Vincze (2009) set similar requirements for 
rational consumers: (i) they have intrinsic, consistent and complete preferences; (ii) 
they select the most beneficial option subject to their own physical and information 
constraints; and (iii) the assessment of their opportunities is only limited by their 
own lack of information. These criteria are profoundly reflected in the premise 
of instrumental rationality (rational tool selection). In essence, the concept of 
instrumental rationality asserts that – regardless of their objectives – decision-
makers are assumed to choose the best tools to achieve their goals (Kolodny–
Brunero 2013).
This rationality assumption of neoclassical economics has received much criticism. 
An example is related to the work of one of the most acclaimed pioneers of 
behavioural economics, Herbert Simon (1947, 1955, 1959, 1972, 1986, 1991) and 
his bounded rationality theory. This may be because Simon’s (1959) approach 
to economics was behaviouristic in the first place: he criticised normative 
microeconomics for wanting to know how economic agents “ought to behave, not 
how they do behave”. In addition, even his personal experiences motivated him to 
develop the theory of bounded rationality. As a fresh graduate, he landed his first 
job at the local public administration. He was astonished to find that none of his 
economics training was put to use at the workplace: rather than comparing the 
marginal benefit of a proposed expenditure with its marginal cost, decisions were 
made on the basis of entirely different considerations (Simon 1999).
The approach that recognised that economic agents were bound to face 
uncertainties and risks in their decisions did a great deal to soften the model of 
perfect rationality in itself (Jones 1999; Simon 1972). Thus, since the actor has 
incomplete information about the consequences, in order to maximise the expected 
return, he must make a choice by assigning probabilities to individual options 
(according to the “hard” approach, this is still performed completely rationally).
The theory of bounded rationality moves beyond this approach by asserting that the 
individual faces a number of constraints in making practical decisions (Simon 1972). 
The lack of individuals’ information on the alternatives, the cognitive limitations 
of their minds and the finite amount of time they have to make decisions are 
examples of such constraints (Schiliró 2012). These factors are also interrelated. The 
premise of neoclassical microeconomics, which presumes the presence of “search 
goods” in the economy (commodities on which all information is readily available 
with no additional cost), fails to work in practice (Weimer–Vining 2011). In reality, 
gathering information is an expensive and potentially time-consuming process; 
consumers therefore are not tempted to collect all relevant information in support 
of their decision. They would not have a chance to do so in any case, given the time 
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constraints and the natural cognitive limitations of the human mind. Thus, according 
to Simon (1955), the theory of bounded rationality underpins the practical, rather 
than the logical impossibility of perfect rationality.
The strength of the theory is demonstrated by the fact that its statements raise 
serious questions even in the most basic situations of neoclassical microeconomics. 
An example for that is the case of the pure monopoly which, in practice, would have 
to amass an enormous amount of complex information in order to understand the 
demand curve for its product and hence maximise its profit. It further complicates 
the monopoly’s predicament that any new pricing decision on its part will 
prompt other companies to follow suit. This in turn will have a repeated impact 
on the demand for the monopoly’s product, and the monopoly will have to start 
gathering information again (Arrow 1986). It is easy to see that this would be rather 
cumbersome in practice, if possible at all.
Due to its empirical orientation, the theory of bounded rationality has found ready 
acceptance in political science, whereas the theoretical discipline of economics 
largely ignored it (Jones 1999; Simon 1999). It has become clear, however, that 
economics cannot afford to ignore the notion of bounded rationality for long. 
Indeed, it is not only embraced by the behavioural school today, but it has also 
proven itself in the mainstream.
The theory of bounded rationality is accepted even by authors who do not use it as 
a point of reference. They often cite the “as if” argument (see for example, Friedman 
1953); namely, they profess to focus on the behaviour of decision-makers (and the 
results thereof), and are not concerned about how agents make their decisions. 
From this perspective, it is enough if the individual acts “as if” his decisions were 
perfectly rational, even though it is not the case in reality (Conlisk 1996; Rubinstein 
1998).
In addition to the above, the theory of bounded rationality was an excellent starting 
point for studying human behaviour and decision-making, enhancing academic 
thinking and connecting the insights with other topics. Noteworthy topics include, 
for example, the “Two Systems” theory (Kahneman 2003), which is closely related 
to cognitive sciences and describes the two modes of decision-making, and the 
rational ignorance theory, which models the political votes of voters (Downs 1990). 
The theory of March (1991; 1994) and March and Olsen (2004) about the “logic of 
appropriateness” i.e. rule-following modelling human decision-making is also worth 
mentioning. As opposed to the model of rational decision-making, in their paper the 
authors propose a framework where, faced with the complexity of the problems to 
be solved, instead considering a rational cost-benefit analysis the individual makes 
his decision by trying to answer the following question: “What does a person such as 
I do in a situation such as this?” In addition to this, the theory of bounded rationality 
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– or more precisely, Simon (1991) himself – largely contributed to the understanding 
of organisational behaviour and the decision-making processes of organisations 
by laying the foundations of procedural rationality. Indeed, the limited cognitive 
abilities of individuals may explain why, rather than maximising, organisations tend 
to adopt task performance rules, which give rise to complex role structures and 
routinise the decision-making mechanisms of the organisation (Jones 1999).
It is apparent that the workings of human decision-making are far more complicated 
than the rationality model of neoclassical economics envisaged. This, however, does 
not imply the inevitable rejection of the classical rationality postulate, nor does 
it suggest that we should surmise the irrationality of economic agents from the 
deterioration of rationality. Quite the contrary: the theory of bounded rationality 
underscores that, while economic agents intend to be rational in their decisions, 
they fail to do so in practice (achieve perfect rationality) because of their cognitive 
limitations (Jones 1999).
The recognition of the limitation of rationality benefited mainstream economics 
itself, while providing a basis for extensive research in behavioural economics as 
well. Its gradual integration into mainstream thinking facilitates a more realistic 
approach to the problems arising, encouraging the use of multiple perspectives and 
potentially less simplification. Thus, although the behavioural school has questioned 
a core assumption of neoclassical economics, by developing the bounded rationality 
model it complemented, rather than destroyed its results and opened up new 
avenues for exploration.
5. Self-interest in neoclassical and behavioural economics
Besides rationality, another basic premise of economics is self-interest. The concept 
appeared initially in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776) and subsequently 
crystallised in Edgeworth3 (1881). The assumption of an economic agent’s self-seeking 
– which initially served as a countervailing force to passion (Hirschman 1998) – 
did an excellent service to economics. It can be used to capture different economic 
trends by means of “well behaved” and easy to calibrate models. However, the 
empirical results of behavioural and experimental economics demonstrated that 
people are far from being self-seekers in all situations.
Before presenting an overview of the criticism, it is important to stress that self-
interest is a neutral attitude, far from being identical with resentment, jealousy or 
malevolence (Hámori 2003a). Of course, this does not mean that these categories 
are unknown to behavioural economics. Their inclusion in the theory, however, 
3  Although Edgeworth (1881:16) asserts that “The first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated 
only by self-interest”, some of his models may well be considered the forerunners of the use of social 
incomes, to be outlined below in the context of Becker.
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is made possible precisely by a broadening of perspective which paved the way 
for studying – in addition to neutral self-interest – goodwill, altruism or any other 
emotional motivation.
Initially, the economic school that presumes strict self-interest could not interpret 
altruism at all, even though its existence had been proved time and time again by 
everyday observations and by the research of experimental economics (see for 
example, Rose-Ackerman 1996; Gächter et al. 2012). The economists who presumed 
the existence of some benevolence, considered it to be a part of human nature 
(Becker 1976), and associated it with given preferences (Stigler–Becker 1989). 
That notwithstanding, the phenomenon of altruism has now been examined by 
several authors, based on various approaches and interpretations. Since their full 
presentation is beyond the scope of this paper, we limit our comments to a few 
general characteristics and two more profound interpretations of altruism.
Although the literature does not offer a precise definition of altruism, its different 
manifestations can be classified into the following three categories: selfish altruism, 
reciprocal altruism and pure altruism (Hámori 2003a).
We talk about selfish altruism when a person behaves as if he was acting unselfishly, 
while in reality he is driven by his own interests. In practice, this type of altruism 
is not very different from pure self-interest, and the ostensibly altruistic action is 
all but a tool to maximise profit. Reciprocal altruism can be best described by the 
concept of “gift-exchange” (Gächter et al. 2012). In essence, the person exercises 
altruism because some day he expects to be rewarded in kind. This differs from 
selfish altruism in the sense that the reciprocal altruist does not expect reciprocity 
in the same transaction, from the same person he benefited. He merely counts 
on receiving the same generosity in a similar situation from another member of 
society. In this regard, reciprocal altruism does not represent a mutually beneficial 
transaction between two persons, as is the case in market exchange; it merely 
expects good deeds to be reciprocated over the long run at the level of society. 
Beyond all this, pure altruism is the phenomenon when a person exercises altruism 
toward others truly unselfishly, without hope for some future reward4 (Hámori 
2003a).
From the perspective of evolution, the dominance of self-interest was a notion 
broadly advocated by natural sciences as well; at the same time, similar to their 
peers in economics, some biologists and geneticists asked themselves the following 
4  Critics of the category often argue that even pure altruism can be traced back to a form of self-love (Hámori 
2003a). They claim that good deeds done for others by an altruist imply a utility increment benefiting 
the altruist himself; ergo, his behaviour can be practically attributed to self-seeking utility maximisation. 
Although below we will touch upon an interpretation where the usefulness of other persons is also included 
in the utility function, for the purposes of this paper, we will not attempt to provide justification for the 
existence of this category.
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question: if self-interest has the highest survival value, why can we observe altruistic 
behaviour among animals as well as human beings? In other words: why should 
altruistic behaviour – which, by definition, reduces the individual’s chances of 
survival – also survive? Sociobiology sought an answer to this question by building 
models with group selection. They propose that altruism can be observed between 
kin, i.e. individuals sharing the same gene pool. According to this approach, although 
the altruistic deed reduces the chances of survival for the altruist himself, it 
improves the genetic fitness of his kin. At the group level, then, altruism is a rational 
behaviour (Becker 1976; Hirshleifer 1978).
According to Becker (1976), this altruism interpretation can be also applied to 
economics. He built a two-person model in which he introduced, as a new category, 
the altruist’s social income which, besides his own income, also includes the income 
of the beneficiary partner. As a result, an altruistic attitude can be reconciled 
with the features of the self-seeking homo oeconomicus by inserting the utility 
(or income) of the beneficiary partner into the utility function maximised by the 
altruist. Thus, the positive effects deriving from connecting different utilities may 
be sufficient to dominate the direct disadvantages of being altruistic.
Besides incorporating altruism into his theory by relying on the orthodox tools of 
economics and describing altruism as a rational activity, Becker’s model yielded 
additional positive results. Most importantly, by using his model involving an altruist 
and a related egoist, he pointed out that, due to the linkage between their utility 
functions, the behaviour of the altruist may be an incentive for the egoist to act 
as if he himself were an altruist. Thus, in some cases, even the egoist will refrain 
from steps that would reduce the income of the altruist or, in other cases, may even 
tolerate the reduction of his own income if it sufficiently increases the altruist’s. 
Becker (1974) described the practical manifestation of this theory using a multi-
player family model as an example and by outlining the “rotten-kid theorem”. Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) used a similar method – inserting relative income distribution 
into the utility function – to provide evidence that economic agents do not 
necessarily prefer inequality; in some cases they tend to have a preference for 
altruism even to the detriment of their own utility. Similarly, Charness and Rabin 
(2002) build their model along the lines of social preferences (consideration for 
others’ social welfare) demonstrating that subjects are more willing to take sacrifices 
to increase the payoffs for low-payoff recipients.
Despite these positive results, the approach presented above is also open to 
theoretical criticism: the application of interdependent utility functions may be 
challenged. While the existence of group-level rationality might be acceptable 
in sociobiological arguments, it is not necessarily true from the perspective 
of economics, a science firmly rooted in individual-level rationality. Indeed, 
the application of interdependent preferences (Pollak 1976) violates the core 
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assumption of the discipline, the principle of methodological individualism (Frey–
Stutzer 2000), rendering the preferences of players instable (Hámori 2003a). That 
notwithstanding, the method is undeniably good: in certain situations, it captures 
the behaviour of individuals better than the neoclassical approach; thus, subject 
to methodological reservations, its existence within the discipline can be justified.
In contrast to the above, Simon (1990, 1991, 1993) relied on the theory of bounded 
rationality to derive the operating logic of altruism. He maintained that, instead 
of perpetually performing cost-benefit calculations, in certain decision situations 
individuals are inclined to act on the basis of learned patterns (cf. March 1991, 
1994; March–Olsen 2004). According to Simon, these patterns may derive from 
other members of the society and, given that altruism – as sociobiologists found – 
benefits the entire society at group level, society itself may be inclined to encourage 
easily influenced (docile) individuals for altruism.
In summary, it is apparent that altruism has numerous interpretations and 
methodological approaches, even within the behavioural paradigm. This 
suggests that we are faced with an existing phenomenon. We may not be able to 
explain altruism with one hundred per cent precision, but we cannot ignore the 
phenomenon, especially in view of its capability of improving the predictive power 
of economic models and the accuracy of forecasts.
6. Summary
This essay was intended to demonstrate that, as early as the previous century, 
the science of economics was aware of and to a certain degree acknowledged 
the theories of bounded rationality and altruism. This is all the more true in light 
of the heterogeneous nature of economics: outside of the realm of the uniform 
mainstream, there are numerous heterodox schools, different in approach, 
methodology and assertions alike. This paper has focused on one of them, 
behavioural economics, and responded to the criticism of “economics as a whole”.
As we pointed out, one of the main aspirations of the behavioural school was to 
use the approach of behaviourism to build its theories on more realistic benchmark 
assumptions. Important building blocks in this endeavour included the recognition 
of the individual’s cognitive limitations and altruistic attitudes towards others, and 
the insertion of these elements into the modelling of human nature. Since most 
of these results have now been accepted into mainstream economics, it would be 
a mistake to assume that the science of economics (whether in general, or limited 
to certain schools) is unaware of these categories.
Nevertheless, the science of economics – including its conclusions – should always 
be open to criticism, all the more so as this is a good incentive for researchers 
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to capture reality better. Such challenges may have ultimately led to the results 
presented above and integration of most of the achievements into the mainstream. 
Thus, as we pointed out, critiques asserting that the discipline only recognises the 
rigorous human model of homo oeconomicus can be refuted. In this paper we 
provided evidence to the contrary by demonstrating that a far more extensive range 
of tools is available to researchers, modellers and forecasters, and henceforth, the 
utilisation of these tools hinges only upon their responsible decisions and available 
resources.
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